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Abstract—This paper considers rateless network error correc-
tion codes for reliable multicast in the presence of adversarial
errors. Most existing network error correction codes are designed
for a given network capacity and maximum number of errors
known a priori to the encoder and decoder. However, in certain
practical settings it may be necessary to operate without such
a priori knowledge. We present rateless coding schemes for two
adversarial models, where the source sends more redundancy
over time, until decoding succeeds. The first model assumes
there is a secret channel between the source and the destination
that the adversaries cannot overhear. The rate of the channel
is negligible compared to the main network. In the second
model, instead of a secret channel, the source and destination
share random secrets independent of the input information. The
amount of secret information required is negligible compared to
the amount of information sent. Both schemes are optimal in that
decoding succeeds with high probability when the total amount of
information received by the sink satisfies the cut set bound with
respect to the amount of message and error information. The
schemes are distributed, polynomial-time and end-to-end in that
other than the source and destination nodes, other intermediate
nodes carry out classical random linear network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding is a technique that allows the mixing of
data at intermediate network nodes instead of simply relaying
them. It has been shown theoretically that such codes are
capable of achieving multicast network capacity and can be
implemented in a distributed manner, as well as improving ro-
bustness against packet losses and link failures [1], [2], [3], [4].
However, comparing with pure forwarding of packets, network
coding is more vulnerable to attack by malicious adversaries
that inject corrupted packets, since a single corrupted packet
is mixed with other packets in the network. The use of coding
to correct such errors information theoretically was introduced
by [5], [6], and capacity-achieving network error correction
codes have been proposed for various adversary and network
models, e.g. [7], [8], [9]. However, most existing schemes
assume a given min cut (capacity) of the network and max-
imum number of adversarial errors for the purposes of code
design and encoding. But such an assumption may be overly
restrictive in many practical settings. For example, in large
peer-to-peer content distribution networks, estimating network
capacity is not easy, and the capacity is likely to change over
time as users join and leave the network. Furthermore, it would
be even more difficult to decide the number of malicious nodes
and their strength. This issue becomes more serious if the
source is multicasting to many destinations, where different
destinations may require different code constructions to suit
their own parameters.
This paper proposes rateless network error correction codes
that do not require an a priori estimates of the network ca-
pacity and number of errors. The source transmits redundancy
incrementally until decoding succeeds. The supply of encoded
packets is potentially limitless and the number of encoded
packets actually transmitted is determined by the number
of errors that occur. A number of related works e.g. [10],
[11], [12] propose cryptographic schemes that can be used to
detect and remove errors in rateless network codes, while [13]
proposes a rateless network error correction scheme that re-
quires cryptographic means of verifying successful decoding.
In contrast, our work presents the first completely information-
theoretic rateless network error correction codes.
We design two algorithms targeting different network mod-
els. In the first model, also studied in [8], there is a secret
channel between the source and the destination that is hidden
from the adversary (who is omniscient except for the secret),
and the rate of the channel is negligible compared to the
network. In this case over time we incrementally send more
linearly dependent redundancy of the source message through
the network to combat erasures, and incrementally send more
(linearly independent) short hashes of the message on the
secret channel to eliminate fake information. The destination
amasses both kinds of redundancy until he decodes success-
fully. The code will adapt to the actual min cut of the network
as well as the number of errors.
The second scenario is the random secret model [9], where
instead of a secret channel, the source and destination share a
“small” fixed random secret that is independent of the input
message. The amount of secrets required is again negligible
compared to the amount of information sent. The random se-
cret model may be more realistic than the secret channel model
because it allows the source and destination to share their
secrets in advance and use them for later communication over
time. It is also possible for source and destination to share only
a secret seed and generate pseudo random sequences with the
seed [14]. Compared to the secret channel model, the challenge
is that both linearly dependent and independent redundancy
must be sent over the public and unreliable network. Again,
our code will adapt to the network and adversary parameters.
Both schemes are distributed with polynomial-time com-
2plexity of design and implementation. They assume no knowl-
edge of the topology and work in both wired and wireless
networks. Moreover, implementation involves only slightly
modifying the source encoder and destination decoder, while
internal nodes use standard random linear network coding.
II. NETWORK MODELS
A. Adversary Model
The source Alice wishes to communicate reliably with the
destination Bob over a general network, where there is a hid-
den attacker Calvin who wants to disrupt the communication.
Calvin is assumed to be able to observe all the transmissions
over the network, and know the encoding and decoding
schemes at Alice, Bob, as well as all other intermediate
nodes. He is also aware of the network topology. Calvin
can corrupt transmitted packets or inject erroneous packets.
Finally, we assume Calvin to be computationally unbounded,
so information-theoretic security is required in this case.
However, we assume that Calvin’s knowledge is limited
in some aspects. Two limitation models are discussed in this
paper. For the first model, in addition to the given network,
we assume there is a secret channel between Alice and Bob,
i.e., the information transmitted on this channel will not be
observed or modified by Calvin [8]. However, the rate of
the channel is negligible compared to the network. In the
second model, we assume the source and destination share a
small amount of random secret information that is independent
with the input information [9]. Again, the amount of secret
information required is negligible compared to the amount
of information sent. As we will show later, the differences
between the two models and the respective code constructions
are substantial.
B. Network Model
We model the network in the general case as a hypergraph
where nodes are vertices and hyperedges are directed from the
transmitting nodes to the set of the receiving nodes [15]. Let
E be the set of hyperedges and T be the set of nodes. Alice
and Bob are not assumed to have knowledge of the topology
of the hypergraph. They also may not know the capacity of
the network as well as the number of errors that the adversary
can inject.
Source Alice encodes her information bits into a batch of
b packets by the encoding schemes described in subsequent
sections. Each packet contains a sequence of n + b symbols
from the finite field Fq. Let matrix X0 = Fb×(n+b)q be one
batch of packets from Alice that is desired to be communicated
to Bob. We call the successful communication of one batch of
information bits X0 to the destination a session. For clarity,
we focus on one such session. In the rateless setting, because
Alice does not know the network capacity and error patterns, a
session may require multiple network transmissions until Bob
receives enough redundancy to cope with errors and decode
correctly. Assume in general that a session involves N stages,
i.e., N uses of the network, where N is a variable. During
the i-th stage, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , denote the capacity (min cut from
Alice to Bob) of the network as Mi, and the number of errors
(min cut from Calvin to Bob) that the adversary injects as
zi. We assume zi < Mi, otherwise the network capacity is
completely filled with errors and it is not possible to transmit
anything. For any realistic network, Mi is always bounded. For
example, let ci be the number of transmission opportunities
that occur to the source during the i-th stage, then Mi ≤ ci.
For convenience we further assume ci ≤ c¯, ∀i.
III. CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR SECRET CHANNEL MODEL
A. Encoder
Alice’s encoder has a structure similar to the secret channel
model in [8], but operates in a rateless manner. In each session
Alice transmits nb incompressible information symbols from
Fq to Bob. Alice arranges them into a matrix W ∈ Fb×nq ,
and encodes X0 = (W Ib), where Ib is the identity ma-
trix of dimension b. Then, as in [16], [4], Alice performs
random linear combinations to the rows of X0 to generate
her transmitted packets. Specifically, Alice draws a random
matrix K1 ∈ Fc1×bq and encodes X1 = K1X0. Note that the
redundant identity matrix receives the same linear transform
so we can recover X0. X1 is then send over a network
where intermediate nodes implement random linear coding. In
addition, Alice will hash the message and send it through the
secret channel. She sets α1 = bc1, and draws random symbols
r1, ..., rα1+1 independently and uniformly from Fq. Note that
the {rj} are drawn secretly so that Calvin cannot observe
them. Let D1 = [dkj ] ∈ F(n+b)×(α1+1)q , where dkj = (rj)k,
and then the hash is computed as H1 = X0D1. Finally Alice
sends r1, ..., rα1+1 and H1 to Bob through the secret channel.
The size of the secret is (α1+1)(b+1), which is asymptotically
negligible in n.
Alice then keeps sending more redundant information to
Bob as follows. For the i-th stage, i ≥ 2, Alice draws
a random matrix Ki ∈ Fci×bq , encodes Xi = KiX0, and
sends Xi over the network. In addition, Alice again draws
r1, ..., rαi randomly from Fq secretly, where αi = bci. She
then constructs Di = [dkj ] ∈ F(n+b)×αiq , dkj = (rj)k, and
computes Hi = X0Di. Alice eventually sends r1, ..., rαi
and Hi to Bob through the secret channel. The size of the
secret is αi(b+1), again asymptotically negligible in n. Alice
repeats this procedure until Bob indicates decoding success.
If a success is indicated, Alice ends the current session and
moves onto the next session.
B. Decoder
The network performs a classical distributed network code
(which is shown to suffice to achieve capacity for multicast
[4]). Specifically, each packet transmitted by an intermediate
node is a random linear combination of its incoming packets.
For the i-th stage, we can describe this linear relation as
Yi = [Ti Qi]
[
Xi
Zi
]
,
where Yi ∈ FMi×(n+b)q is Bob’s received observation, Zi ∈
F
zi×(n+b)
q is the errors injected by Calvin, and Ti and Qi are
3defined to be the transfer matrix from Alice to Bob and from
Calvin to Bob, respectively. By stacking all the batches of
observations received by the i-th stage, let
Y (i) =


Y1
.
.
.
Yi

 , Z(i) =


Z1
.
.
.
Zi

 ,
H(i) = [H1 ... Hi] , D
(i) = [D1...Di] ,
Tˆ (i) =


T1K1 Q1 0 ... 0
T2K2 0 Q2 ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
TiKi 0 0 ... Qi

 =
[
T (i) | Q(i)
]
.
Then we have
Y (i) =
[
T (i) Q(i)
] [ X0
Z(i)
]
, (1)
X0D
(i) = H(i), (2)
where (1) follows from the network transform, and (2) follows
from the code construction. Notice that only Y (i), D(i) and
H(i) are available to Bob, and he needs to recover X0 from
equations (1), (2). Bob can accomplish this only if X0 is in
the row space of Y (i).
Suppose X0 indeed lies in the row space of Y (i) (it happens
with high probability for some i as shown later), then there
exists Xs such that
X0 = X
sY (i). (3)
Therefore Bob only needs to find Xs, which may be achieved
by solving
XsY (i)D(i) = H(i). (4)
If (4) has a unique solution for Xs, Bob reconstructs X0 ac-
cording to (3) and feedbacks an acknowledgement of decoding
success to Alice. If there exists no solution for (4), Bob waits
for more redundancy to come. Otherwise, if there are multiple
solutions for (4), Bob declares a decoding failure.
C. Performance
In the following we will show that the probability of error,
including the events that Bob declares an error, or the events
that X0 is not in the row space of Y (i), or there exists some
other X ′ 6= X0 that satisfies (4), is vanishing as q →∞.
We first show that under proper conditions, X0 is in the row
span of Y (i). The following lemma is well-known [17]:
Lemma 1: If the linear transform Tˆ (i) has full column rank,
i.e., Rank(Tˆ (i))= b +∑ij=1 zj , then it is left-invertible, and
there exists Xs such that XsY (i) = X0.
Now we show that Tˆ (i) almost always has either full column
rank or full row rank as q →∞.
Lemma 2: If b +
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj , then Tˆ (i) has full
column rank with high probability1.
1Event E happens with high probability (w.h.p.) if limq→∞ Pr{E} = 1.
Proof: The proof follows an idea similar to [8] with
the difference that we consider communications over multiple
stages. Notice that Tˆ (i) =
[
T (i) Q(i)
]
. Since b+
∑i
j=1 zj ≤∑i
j=1Mj , it follows b ≤
∑i
j=1Mj . Because Tj has full
rank and Kj are random matrices, if b ≤
∑i
j=1Mj , then the
probability that the columns of T (i) are linearly dependent is
upper bounded by b/q → 0 by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma.
So T (i) has full column rank. Without loss of generality we
assume Q(i) also has full column rank, otherwise we can
select a basis of the column space of Q(i) and reformulate
the problem with a reduced zi. Furthermore, by [18], if
b +
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj , the probability that the column
spans of T (i) and Q(i) intersects anywhere other than in the
zero vector is upper bounded by i2|T ||E|q−1 for a fix adver-
sary pattern. Since Calvin can choose his locations in at most( i|E|∑
j
zj
)
ways, by the union bound, the probability that T (i)
and Q(i) intersects is bounded by
(
i|E|∑
j zj
)
i2|T ||E|q−1 → 0.
Hence Tˆ (i) has full column rank with high probability.
Corollary 1: If b +
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj , then with high
probability there exists a Xs such that XsY (i) = X0.
Next we need to show the solution is unique, i.e., the hash
is strong enough so that Bob can distill the injected error.
Lemma 3: For any X ′ 6= X0, the probability that X ′D(i) =
H(i) is bounded from above by ((n+ b)/q)
∑
i
k=1 αk+1
.
Proof: It is equivalent to consider the probability that
(X ′−X0)D
(i) = 0. Since X ′−X0 6= 0, there is at least one
row in which X ′ differs from X0. Denote this row of X ′−X0
as (x1, ..., xn+b), then the j-th entries of the corresponding
row of (X ′ − X0)D(i) is F (rj) =
∑n+b
k=1 xkr
k
j . Because
F (rj) is not the zero polynomial, the probability (over rj ) that
F (rj) = 0 is at most (n+b)/q. Because D(i) has
∑i
k=1 αk+1
columns, and all rj , 1 ≤ j ≤
∑i
k=1 αk+1, are independently
chosen, the probability that the entire row is a zero vector is
at most ((n+ b)/q)
∑
i
k=1 αk+1
. This is an upper bound of the
probability that the entire matrix of (X ′−X0)D(i) is zero.
Lemma 4: The probability that there exists V s 6= Xs such
that V sY (i) 6= X0 but V sY (i)D(i) = H(i) is upper bounded
by (n+ b)
∑
i
k=1 αk+1/q → 0.
Proof: Note that the dimension of V s is
b
i∑
j=1
Mj ≤ b
i∑
j=1
cj
over Fq . So by invoking Lemma 3 and then take the union
bound over all possible choices of V s, the claim follows.
Now we are ready to present the main result for the shared
secret model.
Theorem 1: ∀i such that b+
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj , with the
proposed coding scheme, Bob is able to decode X0 correctly
with high probability at the i-th stage. Otherwise, Bob waits
for more redundancy instead of decoding erroneous packets.
Proof: By Corollary 1, we can solve X0 from (3) and (4)
if b+
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj . By Lemma 4, if a solution exists,
it is correct and unique. Otherwise, there is no solution to (4)
and by the algorithm Bob waits for more redundancy.
4Theorem 1 shows the code is optimal in that decoding
succeeds with high probability whenever the total amount of
information received by the sink satisfies the cut set bound,
i.e., b +
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj. If the bound is not satisfied,
then it is not possible for Bob to decode correctly under any
coding scheme. The following result shows that the code is
rate optimal if the network capacity and number of errors are
i.i.d. across stages.
Theorem 2: Assume Mi, zi, i = 1, 2... are i.i.d. random
variables with mean E[M ] and E[z], respectively. If there
exists ǫ > 0 such that E[M ]−E[z] ≥ ǫ, then with the proposed
coding scheme, Bob is able to decode X0 correctly with high
probability in a finite number of stages. Further, on average
the code achieves rate
r ≥
b
b+ c¯− 1
(E[M ]− E[z]) .
Proof: Let L = b/ǫ, and let random variable ∆j = Mj−
zj , so E[∆j ] = ǫ and denote Var[∆j ] = σ2∆ < ∞. Then for
N ≥ L, E[
∑N
j=1∆j ] = Nǫ = b+(N −L)ǫ. By Chebyshev’s
inequality,
Pr


N∑
j=1
∆j ≥ b


= Pr


N∑
j=1
∆j ≥ E

 N∑
j=1
∆j

− (N − L)ǫ


≥ 1− Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
∆j − E

 N∑
j=1
∆j


∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ (N − L)ǫ


≥ 1−
Nσ2∆
(N − L)2ǫ2
→ 1 as N →∞.
So with high probability there exists finite N ≥ L such that
b+
∑N
j=1 zj ≤
∑N
j=1Mj . And by Theorem 1, Bob is able to
decode successfully at stage N . Next we determine the average
rate, let
N = min

i : b+
i∑
j=1
zj ≤
i∑
j=1
Mj

 .
Then the average rate of the code is
r = E
[
b
N
]
≥
b
E[N ]
, (5)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Denote Sτ =
∑τ
j=1Mj −
∑τ
j=1 zj , then N is a stopping
time for the random process Sτ . Therefore, by the first Wald
identity [19],
E[N ](E[M ]− E[z]) = E[SN ]
≤ b+ c¯− 1.
Therefore
E[N ] ≤
b + c¯− 1
E[M ]− E[z]
.
Substituting into (5), it follows
r ≥
b
b+ c¯− 1
(E[M ]− E[z]) .
Notice that as we choose a sufficiently large b, then the rate
of the code is approaching E[M ] − E[z], which is shown to
be the maximal achievable rate for networks with Byzantine
adversaries [20]. The computational cost of design, encoding,
and decoding is dominated by the cost of carrying out the
matrix multiplication Y (i)D(i) in (4), which is O(n(ic¯)3).
Notice that because Y (i) and D(i) grow regularly, Y (i)D(i)
is a block of Y (i+1)D(i+1), therefore careful implementation
of the algorithm can improve complexity (though not in the
order sense) by building on the results from the last stage.
Assume in general that Y (i)D(i) = AT and(
Y (i+1)D(i+1)
)T
=
[
A C
B D
]
.
Then at stage i+1 we only need to perform the multiplications
corresponding to blocks B, C, and D. The same trick applies
when we are to perform row reduction on Y (i)D(i). Suppose
at the i-th stage we have already reduced A into row echelon
form with matrix R, i.e., with high probability it follows
(otherwise there is a decoding error)
RA = A′ =
[
I
0
]
.
At the (i + 1)-th stage we want to reduce
(
Y (i+1)D(i+1)
)T
into row echelon form based on the knowledge of R. We can
construct the row operations as the following steps: i) multiply
R to reduce block A and obtain [A′ RC] in the upper blocks;
ii) use A′ to cancel block B to zero; iii) perform row reduction
on the lower right block corresponding to D; iv) use the row
reduced lower right block to cancel the upper right block to
zero. Formally, let
R′ =
[
I −RC|0
0 I
] [
I 0
0 D−
] [
I 0
−B|0 0
] [
R 0
0 I
]
where D− is the matrix that row reduces [B|0]RC+D, where
the 0 after B is defined as a zero padding sub-matrix of
appropriate dimension. Then it follows
R′Y (i+1)D(i+1) =


I
0
0
0
I
0

 .
Finally we only need to permute the rows to place the identity
matrix on top. Note that by this algorithm at every stage
we only need to perform row reduction on a small block
(corresponding to D) plus several multiplications.
IV. CODE CONSTRUCTION FOR RANDOM SECRET MODEL
In this section we consider the case that a secret channel is
not available between Alice and Bob, instead they only share
a “small” random secrets whose size is negligible compared to
5the amount of information sent. The random secret model is
similar to the previously discussed secret channel model with
the difference that the secret information should be random
and independent with the source message X0. Therefore in
this case Alice cannot send the hash of X0 to Bob secretly
and reliably. Nutman and Langberg [9] modifies the scheme
in [8] against Byzantine adversaries under the secret channel
model so that it also works for the random secret model. The
essential idea is to prefix X0 with a small matrix L obtained
by solving the hash relation (L X0)D = H , where both D
and H are the fixed random secrets. Then (L X0) is sent
through the network as the new input message. However, there
is no obvious way to make this scheme rateless, because in
the rateless setting, the number of columns of D and H will
grow over time as more linearly independent redundancy is
needed. But this implies it is not possible to uniquely solve L
given a fixed X0.
The difficulty in solving L reveals the restriction of defining
the hash relation in the matrix form of X0D = H . Hence a
more flexible way for hashing the data is required as discussed
in the following. Recall that the vectorization of a matrix is a
linear transformation which converts the matrix into a column
vector by stacking the columns of the matrix on top of one
another. Let column vector w ∈ Fbnq be the vectorized2 W
(recall that W is the matrix of raw incompressible source data
before attaching the identity matrix, defined in Section III-A).
To generate the hashes, i.e., the linearly independent re-
dundancy that is transmitted at the k-th stage. We first draw
αk symbols from the random shared secrets as d(k)1 , d
(k)
2 , ...,
d
(k)
αk ∈ Fq , and use them to construct the αk×nb parity check
matrix Dk =
[
d
(k)
ij
]
, where d(k)ij =
(
d
(k)
i
)j
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ αk,
1 ≤ j ≤ nb.
Then we draw another αk symbols from the random shared
secrets as h(k)1 , h
(k)
2 , ..., h
(k)
αk and use them to construct the hash
of the message. Let hk = (h(k)1 , ..., h
(k)
αk )
T
. Then the following
parity check relation is enforced:
[Dk Iαk ]
[
w
lk
]
= hk, (6)
where Iαk is the identity matrix of dimension αk and lk is a
column vector of length αk that can be solved uniquely from
(6) as
lk = hk −Dkw
Note that {lk} does not need to be kept secret. Now we can
readily construct a rateless parity check scheme based on (6):

D1 Iα1 0 ... 0
D2 0 Iα2 ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
Di 0 0 ... Iαi




w
l1
.
.
.
li

 =


h1
.
.
.
hi

 , (7)
2Compared to linear transforms on the matrix W , linear transforms on
the vector w are more general (every operation in the former class can be
representation by an operation in the latter class, but not vice versa)
i.e., the total number of parity checks
∑
i αi can grow over
time if necessary.
(7) implies that we are hashing (wT lT )T instead of the
message w itself. However, the advantage of introducing lk
is that by attaching a short suffix to w, we can establish a
virtual secret channel between Alice and Bob. Nevertheless,
the challenge is then we need to send not only w but also
{lk} over the unreliable network publicly. In the following
we will discuss the structure of the encoder and decoder for
transmitting them successfully.
A. Encoder
In order for Bob to decode successfully, both linearly
dependent redundancy and linearly independent redundancy
are required. Redundant information that lies in the row space
of X0 is called linearly dependent redundancy and is used to
combat erasures in the network (deletion from the row space
of X0). Other redundant information is linearly independent
redundancy and is used to distill “fake information” that
adversaries inject into the network (addition to the row space
of X0). In the case of the secret channel model, we send
linearly dependent redundancy {Xi} in the network and send
linearly independent redundancy {Di} and {Hi} on the secret
channel. Compared to that, in the case of the random secret
model, a secret channel is not available and both linearly
dependent and independent redundancy must be sent through
the public and unreliable network.
However, notice that the linearly dependent redundancy cor-
responds to long messages that are usually arranged into long
packets, while the linearly independent redundancy is short. Its
size is chosen to be independent with n, as it is desired that
the amount of random secrets required is negligible comparing
to the amount of information sent. Therefore, it is convenient
to encode and send the two kinds of redundancy separately
(for example, it would be wasteful of resources if linearly
independent redundancy is sent in normal packets because
it is too short to fill a packet) as long packets and short
packets, respectively. We define Mi, zi, ci, c¯ for long packets
as described in Section II. For short packets, denote M¯i, c¯i and
z¯i as the min cut from Alice to Bob, the number of available
transmission opportunities, and the min cut from Calvin to Bob
at stage i, respectively. Similarly we assume z¯i < M¯i, ∀i.
We first discuss the encoding scheme for linearly dependent
redundancy. The source input message is arranged as a b× n
matrix W . Then we encode X0 = (W Ib). At the i-th stage,
Alice draws a random matrix Ki ∈ Fci×bq , and encodes the
long packets Xi = KiX0.
To generate the linearly independent redundancy, at stage i
Alice sets αi = iσm (the choices of σ and m are discussed in
the next paragraph), solves li according to (6), and arranges
the column vector into a σ × im matrix Li. Then she let
Lj = (Lj 0D 0j Iσ), 1 ≤ j ≤ i, where 0D is a zero
matrix of size σ× (i− j)m, and 0j is the zero matrix of size
σ× (j − 1)σ. 0D is dummy and is used to align L, and 0j is
used to align the identity matrix. Alice then draws a random
6matrix Gi of size c¯i × iσ and encodes the short packets as
Ai = Gi


L1 0 ... 0
L2 ... 0
· · ·
Li

 = GiL(i).
In order to eliminate the “fake” information injected by the
adversaries, Alice should introduce an adequate amount of
linearly independent redundancy, i.e., choosing {αi} appro-
priately. Alice may choose any σ such that σ ≤ M¯i − z¯i, ∀i
(e.g., σ = 1 is a safe choice). She then chooses m such
that σm ≥ 2bc¯ + 2σc¯ + 1. Note that the size of the secret,
i(i+ 1)σm/2, is again negligible in n.
Finally, at the i-th stage Alice sends Xi as long packets
with packet length n+ b, and Ai as short packets with packet
length i(m+σ). Alice repeats this procedure until Bob decodes
successfully.
B. Decoder
At the i-th stage, Bob receives long packets Yi and short
packets Ji:
Yi = TiXi +QiZi, (8)
Ji = T¯iAi + Q¯iEi, (9)
where Ti ∈ FMi×ciq , T¯i ∈ FM¯i×c¯iq are the transfer matrices
between Alice and Bob, Qi ∈ FMi×ziq , Q¯i ∈ FM¯i×z¯iq are
the transfer matrices between Calvin and Bob, and Zi ∈
F
zi×(n+b)
q , Ei ∈ F
z¯i×i(m+σ)
q are the errors injected to long
packets and short packets, respectively.
Bob then stacks the long and short packets that he has
received so far to get
Y (i) =


Y1
.
.
.
Yi

 , J (i) =


J1 0 ... 0
J2 ... 0
· · ·
Ji

 ,
where dummy matrix 0D is padded to {Jk} in the same way
as it is padded to {Lk}.
Bob evaluates the rank of Y (i), and waits to receive more
packets if ri =Rank(Y (i)) < b. When ri ≥ b, Bob tries
to decode. Without loss of generality we assume the rows
of Y (i) are linearly independent. Otherwise, Bob selects ri
linearly independent rows from Y (i) and proceeds similarly.
He then picks a basis for the column space of Y (i). As will be
shown later, the last b columns of Y (i) (corresponding to the
identity matrix in X0) are linearly independent w.h.p., so they
are chosen and is denoted by a ri × b matrix Tˆ (i). Without
loss of generality (by permuting the columns if necessary) we
assume that the remaining ri−b linearly independent columns
correspond to the first ri − b columns of Y (i), denoted by a
ri×(ri−b) matrix T ′′(i). So we can expand Y (i) with respect
to this basis as
Y (i) = [T ′′(i) Tˆ (i)]
[
Iri−b F
Z 0
0 FX Ib
]
, (10)
where FZ and FX are matrices of coefficients.
Bob deals with J (i) in a similar way. Let r¯i be the rank
of J (i), ˆ¯T (i) ∈ Fr¯i×iσq be the last iσ columns of J (i), and
T¯ ′′(i) ∈ F
r¯i×(r¯i−iσ)
q be the first r¯i− iσ columns of J (i). Then
w.h.p. [T¯ ′′(i) ˆ¯T (i)] consists a basis of the column space of
J (i), and we can write
J (i) = [T¯ ′′(i) ˆ¯T (i)]
[
Ir¯i−iσ F
E 0
0 FA Iiσ
]
, (11)
where FE and FA are matrices of coefficients.
Equations (10) and (11) characterize the relationship be-
tween the received observations and the input messages due
to the effect of the network transform. In order to decode
successfully, Bob needs to take into account the built-in
redundancy of the message, i.e., the relation between w and
{li}, as follows. ∀i, split X0 and L(i) as:
X0 = [X
(i)
a X
(i)
b X
(i)
c ], (12)
L(i) = [L(i)a L
(i)
b L
(i)
c ], (13)
where X(i)a are the first ri−b columns of X0, X(i)c are the last
b columns of X0, and X(i)b are the remaining columns in the
middle; L(i)a are the first r¯i− iσ columns of L(i), L(i)c are the
last iσ columns of L(i), and L(i)b are the remaining columns in
the middle. Let x(i)a , x(i)b and x
(i)
c be the vectorized versions
of X(i)a , X(i)b and X
(i)
c . Let l(i)a , l(i)b and l
(i)
c be the vectorized
versions of L(i)a , L(i)b and L
(i)
c omitting the dummy 0D. By
construction it follows that,


x
(i)
a
x
(i)
b
l
(i)
a
l
(i)
b

 =


w
l1
.
.
.
li

 . (14)
Note that x(i)c and l(i)c are left out because they correspond to
the redundant identity matrix. Now Bob constructs two matrix
Btop and Bmid as defined in (15) and (16), respectively. Here
fZi,j and fEi,j are the (i, j)th entries of matrix FZ and FE ,
respectively, and β = n+ b− ri, γ = i(m+ σ)− r¯i. He then
deletes all columns in Bmid corresponding to the positions of
the dummy zero padding when vectoring L(i), and obtain a
submatrix B′mid. Finally, Bob let
Bbot =


D1 Iα1 0 ... 0
D2 0 Iα2 ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
Di 0 0 ... Iαi

 ,
Notice that if Bob permutes the columns of Y (i) and J (i)
when constructing T ′′(i) and T¯ ′′(i), then he needs to permute
the columns of Bbot accordingly. Then he tries to solve the
7Btop =


−fZ1,1Tˆ
(i) −fZ2,1Tˆ
(i) ... −fZri−b,1Tˆ
(i) Tˆ (i) 0 ... 0
−fZ1,2Tˆ
(i) −fZ2,2Tˆ
(i) ... −fZri−b,2Tˆ
(i) 0 Tˆ (i) ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−fZ1,βTˆ
(i) −fZ2,βTˆ
(i) ... −fZri−b,β Tˆ
(i) 0 0 ... Tˆ (i)

 (15)
Bmid =


−fE1,1
ˆ¯T (i) −fE2,1
ˆ¯T (i) ... −fEr¯i−iσ,1
ˆ¯T (i) ˆ¯T (i) 0 ... 0
−fE1,2
ˆ¯T (i) −fE2,2
ˆ¯T (i) ... −fEr¯i−iσ,2
ˆ¯T (i) 0 ˆ¯T (i) ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−fE1,γ
ˆ¯T (i) −fE2,γ
ˆ¯T (i) ... −fEr¯i−iσ,γ
ˆ¯T (i) 0 0 ... ˆ¯T (i)

 (16)
equations:
B


x
(i)
a
x
(i)
b
l
(i)
a
l
(i)
b

 =


Tˆ (i)fX
ˆ¯T (i)fA
h1
.
.
.
hi

 , (17)
where fX , fA are the vectorized versions of FX , FA, respec-
tively, Tˆ (i) = diag[Tˆ (i), ..., Tˆ (i)], ˆ¯T (i) = diag[ ˆ¯T (i), ..., ˆ¯T (i)],
and the matrix B is defined as:
B =

 Btop 00 B′mid
Bbot

 .
Bob tries to solve (17) and, if there exists no solution,
he waits for more redundancy from Alice and tries to solve
it again at the next stage. If there is a unique solution to
(17), then Bob has decoded successfully with high probability.
Otherwise, if there are multiple solutions, Bob declares a
decoding failure.
C. Performance
In this section we show the proposed scheme will succeed
with high probability and achieve the optimal rate. Our first
step is to establish (10) and (11). We first consider the short
packets. Note that (11) is shown by Lemma below.
Lemma 5: ˆ¯T (i) has full column rank with high probability.
Proof: For notational convenience we define
T¯ (i) =


T¯1 0 ... 0
0 T¯2 ... 0
...
0 0 ... T¯i

 , A(i) =


A1 0 ... 0
A2 ... 0
· · ·
Ai


Q¯(i) =


Q¯1 0 ... 0
0 Q¯2 ... 0
...
0 0 ... Q¯i

 , E(i) =


E1 0 ... 0
E2 ... 0
· · ·
Ei


Then we have the concise relationship from (8) and (9):
J (i) = T¯ (i)A(i) + Q¯(i)E(i)
= T¯ (i)G(i)L(i) + Q¯(i)E(i), (18)
where
G(i) =


G1 0 ... 0
G2 ... 0
· · ·
Gi

 .
By construction,
∑i
j=1 M¯j −
∑i
j=1 z¯j ≥ iσ. By an argument
identical to Lemma 2, this implies that with high probability
T¯ (i) and Q¯(i) both have full column rank and span disjoint
column spaces (except for the zero vector). Random matrix
G(i) also has full rank w.h.p. and therefore T¯ (i)G(i) and Q¯(i)
also both have full column rank and span disjoint column
spaces. We can write the last iσ columns in (18) corresponding
to the redundant identity matrix in L(i) as
ˆ¯T (i) = T¯ (i)G(i) + Q¯(i)E(i)rear, (19)
where E(i)rear are the last iσ columns of E(i). Hence the columns
of ˆ¯T (i) are linearly independent w.h.p..
A similar argument also holds for the long packets:
Lemma 6: If
∑i
j=1Mj −
∑i
j=1 zj ≥ b, then Tˆ (i) has full
column rank with high probability.
Proof: Consider the last b columns in (1) corresponding
to the redundant identity matrix in X0
Tˆ (i) = T (i) +Q(i)Z(i)rear.
And by Lemma (2), T (i) and Q(i) both have full column rank
and span disjoint column spaces (except for the zero vector).
Hence the columns of Tˆ (i) are linearly independent.
Now we are ready to analyze the key equation (17). We first
prove a related lemma.
Lemma 7: With high probability (9) and (11) are equivalent
to the following equation:
ˆ¯T (i)L
(i)
b =
ˆ¯T (i)(FA + L(i)a F
E). (20)
Proof: We use a technique similar to [8]. Substituting
(19) to (18), it follows
J (i) = ˆ¯T (i)L(i) + Q¯(i)(E(i) − E(i)rearL
(i)).
Then by (11) we have:
ˆ¯T (i)L(i) + Q¯(i)(E(i) − E(i)rearL
(i)) =
ˆ¯T (i)[0 FA Iiσ ] + T¯
′′(i)[Ir¯i−iσ F
E 0]. (21)
8Therefore the columns of T¯ ′′(i) are spanned by the columns
of [ ˆ¯T (i) Q¯(i)]. So there exists matrices V1 and V2 such that
T¯ ′′(i) = ˆ¯T (i)V1 + Q¯
(i)V2.
And we can rewrite (21) as
ˆ¯T (i)L(i) + Q¯(i)(E(i) − E(i)rearL
(i)) =
ˆ¯T (i)[0 FA Iiσ ] + (
ˆ¯T (i)V1 + Q¯
(i)V2)[Ir¯i−iσ F
E 0]. (22)
However, notice from (19) that the columns of ˆ¯T (i) and the
columns of Q¯(i) are w.h.p. linearly independent, i.e., the
column spaces of ˆ¯T (i) and Q¯(i) are disjoint except for the zero
vector. Hence (22) implies the following set of equations:
ˆ¯T (i)L(i) = ˆ¯T (i)[0 FA Iiσ ] +
ˆ¯T (i)V1[Ir¯i−iσ F
E 0] (23)
Q¯(i)(E(i) − E(i)rearL
(i)) = Q¯(i)V2[Ir¯i−iσ F
E 0]. (24)
Here (23) suffices for the purpose of decoding X0. We split
(23) into three parts as in (13), and get:
ˆ¯T (i)L(i)a =
ˆ¯T (i)V1 (25)
ˆ¯T (i)L
(i)
b =
ˆ¯T (i)FA + ˆ¯T (i)V1F
E (26)
ˆ¯T (i)L(i)c =
ˆ¯T (i) (27)
By Lemma 5, ˆ¯T (i) has full column rank and is left-invertible,
therefore by (25) it follows L(i)a = V1. Substituting it into (26)
ˆ¯T (i)L
(i)
b =
ˆ¯T (i)FA + ˆ¯T (i)L(i)a F
E .
Finally, notice that by construction L(i)c is the identity matrix
and therefore (27) is redundant. Hence we can conclude that
(9) and (11) are equivalent to
ˆ¯T (i)L
(i)
b =
ˆ¯T (i)(FA + L(i)a F
E)
.
By a similar argument, for long packets we have the
following result:
Lemma 8: If
∑i
j=1Mj −
∑i
j=1 zj ≥ b, then with high
probability (8) and (10) are equivalent to
Tˆ (i)X
(i)
b = Tˆ
(i)(FX +X(i)a F
Z). (28)
Corollary 2: If
∑i
j=1Mj −
∑i
j=1 zj ≥ b, then the matrix
equation (17) holds with high probability.
Proof: Notice that (17) are equivalent to the following set
of three matrix equations:
Btop
[
x
(i)
a
x
(i)
b
]
= Tˆ (i)fX (29)
B′mid
[
l
(i)
a
l
(i)
b
]
= ˆ¯T (i)fA (30)
Bbot


x
(i)
a
x
(i)
b
l
(i)
a
l
(i)
b

 =


h1
.
.
.
hi

 (31)
But now note that (29) is equivalent to (28); (31) is equivalent
to (7); and (30) is equivalent to (20) because all the deleted
columns correspond to the zero padding in L(i).
Finally we need to prove that (17) has a unique solution,
i.e., the probability of decoding an error packet is vanishing:
Lemma 9: If σm ≥ 2bc¯+2σc¯+1, then with high probability
there does not exist X ′ 6= X0 such that X ′ satisfies (17).
Proof: Suppose X ′ 6= X0, and let x′a, x′b be its vectorized
versions as described in (12). We consider the probability that
there exist x′a, x′b, l′a and l′b that satisfy (17). Let us first
consider the top βri + γr¯i rows in B that correspond to the
blocks of Btop and B′mid
[
Btop 0
0 B′mid
]


x
′(i)
a
x
′(i)
b
l
′(i)
a
l
′(i)
b

 =
[
Tˆ (i)fX
ˆ¯T (i)fA
]
, (32)
They are equivalent to
X
′(i)
b = F
X +X ′(i)a F
Z (33)
L
′(i)
b = F
A + L′(i)a F
E (34)
Therefore given arbitrary values of x′(i)a and l′(i)a , there are
unique corresponding values of x′(i)b and l
′(i)
b that satisfy (32).
Now given any x′(i)a and l′(i)a (and the corresponding x′(i)b
and l′(i)b ) such that (32) holds, we consider the probability that
the bottom
∑i
k=1 αk = (i
2+ i)σm/2 rows in (17) also holds:
Bbot


x
′(i)
a
x
′(i)
b
l
′(i)
a
l
′(i)
b

 =


h1
.
.
.
hi

 (35)
This is equivalent to:
Bbot


x
(i)
a − x
′(i)
a
x
(i)
b − x
′(i)
b
l
(i)
a − l
′(i)
a
l
(i)
b − l
′(i)
b

 = 0, (36)
Because X ′ 6= X0, so x
(i)
a −x
′(i)
a and x(i)b −x
′(i)
b cannot both
be the zero vector. Denote
x(i)a − x
′(i)
a = (x
(i)
a,1, ..., x
(i)
a,θa
)T
x
(i)
b − x
′(i)
b = (x
(i)
b,1, ..., x
(i)
b,θb
)T[
l
(i)
a − l
′(i)
a
l
(i)
b − l
′(i)
b
]
= (l
(i)
1 , ..., l
(i)
θl
)T
where θa = b(ri−b), θb = βb and θl = (i2+ i)σm/2. Denote
the (u, v) entry of Bbot as su,v, then the j-th row of (36) is
b(ri−b)∑
k=1
x
(i)
a,ksj,k +
βb∑
k=1
x
(i)
b,ksj,k+b(ri−b)
+
(i2+i)σm/2∑
k=1
l
(i)
k sj,k+nb = 0 (37)
9Let sj be the (j, 1) entry of Bbot before column permutation,
then sj,k = spi(k)j , 1 ≤ k ≤ nb, where π is a permutation of
{1, ..., nb}. So (37) is a non-zero polynomial of order at most
b(ri−b)+βb = nb in variable sj (the {sj,k+nb} are constants
0 or 1 by construction and are independent with respect to sj).
By the fundamental theorem of algebra the polynomial have
at most nb roots. And the probability that sj is chosen as
one of the roots is at most nb/q, and this is the upper bound
of the probability that row j holds in (36). Because {sj} are
chosen independently, (36) holds with probability no larger
than (nb/q)(i2+i)σm/2.
Finally, there are at most qb(ri−b) different x(i)a and at most
qiσ(r¯i−iσ) different l(i)a . By (8), ri − b ≤ ic¯, and by (9), r¯i −
iσ ≤ ic¯. Therefore by the union bound, the probability that
there exists X ′0 6= X0 such that x′a, x′b, l′a and l′b satisfy (17)
is at most(
nb
q
) (i2+i)σm
2
qibc¯+i
2σc¯ ≤
(nb)i
2σm
qi2
→ 0
We are ready to present the final conclusion.
Theorem 3: ∀i such that b+
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj , with the
proposed coding scheme, Bob is able to decode X0 correctly
with high probability at the i-th stage. Otherwise, Bob waits
for more redundancy instead of decoding erroneous packets.
Proof: By Corollary 2, X0 can be solved from (17) if
b +
∑i
j=1 zj ≤
∑i
j=1Mj . By Lemma 9, if a solution exists,
it is correct and unique. Otherwise, there is no solution to (17)
and by the algorithm Bob waits for more redundancy.
Similar to the case of the secret channel model, Theorem
3 shows that our code is optimal in that sense that decoding
succeeds with high probability whenever the total amount of
information received by the sink satisfies the cut set bound
with respect to the amount of message and error information.
We can also show rate-optimality under the i.i.d. case.
Theorem 4: Assume Mi, zi, i = 1, 2... are i.i.d. random
variables with mean E[M ] and E[z], respectively. If there
exists ǫ > 0 such that E[M ]−E[z] ≥ ǫ, then with the proposed
coding scheme Bob is able to decode X0 correctly with high
probability. And on average the code achieves rate
r ≥
b
b+ c¯− 1
(E[M ]− E[z]) .
Proof: Note that both long packets and short packets are
sent over the network. We consider the short packets to be
overhead. At the i-th stage, the length of a short packet is
i(m+σ), and is negligible as a large enough n is chosen. The
rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 2.
Again the proposed scheme is asymptotically rate optimal
as we choose a large enough b. The computational cost of
design, encoding, and decoding is dominated by the cost of
solving (17), which equals O((nic¯)3).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces information-theoretical rateless re-
silient network codes against Byzantine adversaries. Unlike
previous works, knowledge about the network and adversaries
are not required and the codes will adapt to their parameters by
sending more redundancy over time if necessary. We present
two algorithms targeting two network models. The first model
assumes there is a low-rate secret channel between the source
and the destination. The second model assumes the source
and destination share some “small” random secrets that are
independent with the input information. For both models our
codes are rate-optimal, distributed, polynomial-time, work on
general topology, and only require source and destination
nodes to be modified.
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